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Note
UNNECESSARY ROUGHNESS:
RECONCILING HART AND KELLER WITH A FAIR USE
STANDARD BEFITTING THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
MICHAEL “BUBBA” SCHOENEBERGER
Two lawsuits have created a stir in the sports law community
threatening to derail the NCAA’s monopoly on licensing the images of both
present and former student-athletes. In both Keller v. Electronic Arts, Inc.
and Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., former collegiate quarterbacks attack the
NCAA, the CLC, and Electronic Arts for the unauthorized use of their
likeness in the popular video game franchise NCAA Football. Recent
scholarship has focused on the viability of the NCAA and how these cases
may tear down any semblance of amateurism left in college sports.
This Note, however, focuses on how these two cases have the potential
to inform the relationship between the First Amendment and the right of
publicity. Courts have struggled to devise a test that accurately represents
this relationship, which has spawned myriad tests. What makes Keller and
Hart the perfect test cases is that the cases deal with the exact same issue,
yet come to the opposite conclusion. This Note traces the history and
policy justifications of the right of publicity to derive a fair use standard
befitting the right of publicity. The new fair use factors are then applied to
Keller and Hart’s factual scenarios to show why the outcomes differ and
what appellate courts should do in the future.
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UNNECESSARY ROUGHNESS:
RECONCILING HART AND KELLER WITH A FAIR USE
STANDARD BEFITTING THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
MICHAEL “BUBBA” SCHOENEBERGER∗
I. INTRODUCTION
A rewarding aspect of playing quarterback for Arizona State was the
joy Sam Keller felt whenever he played NCAA Football, the popular video
game from Electronic Arts (“EA”).1 Although his name did not appear in
the game, there was little doubt that Keller inspired the virtual quarterback
leading the Sun Devils’ offense in the 2005 edition.2 Keller and his virtual
counterpart were nearly identical, sharing the same jersey number, height,
weight, skin color, hair color, and hometown.3 Like many other gamers,
Keller found the realism of NCAA Football appealing and vital to his
overall gaming experience.4 Since his days on the gridiron, however,
Keller has come to view the video game as an exploitation of his right of
publicity.5
In 2009, three lawsuits threatened to derail the National Collegiate
Athletic Association’s (“NCAA”) restrictions on student-athlete
compensation.6 Keller filed a class-action suit against EA and the NCAA
alleging a violation of his right of publicity.7 Ed O’Bannon, former UCLA
basketball star, filed suit against the NCAA, the Collegiate Licensing
Company (“CLC”), and EA alleging a conspiracy to require studentathletes to forgo their publicity rights in perpetuity in violation of the
Sherman Act.8 On the east coast, former Rutgers quarterback Ryan Hart
∗

State University of New York at Cortland, B.A. & B.S. 2011; University of Connecticut School
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1
Katie Thomas, College Stars See Themselves in Video Games, and Pause to Sue, N.Y. TIMES,
July 4, 2009, at A1.
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Gina Reif Ilardi, First Amendment v. the Right of Publicity: The Game Is On!, METROPOLITAN
CORP. COUNS., Sept. 2012, at 17.
7
Id.
8
Money
&
March
Madness:
The
NCAA
Lawsuit,
PBS
FRONTLINE,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/money-and-march-madness/ncaa-lawsuit/ (last updated Oct.
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filed a putative class action suit against EA alleging the misappropriation
of student-athletes’ likenesses in connection with several editions of NCAA
Football.9
Scholarly reaction has fixated on the possible downfall of the NCAA.10
A legal victory by any of these former athletes would threaten the status
quo, potentially forcing the NCAA to share its estimated four billion dollar
market for licensed merchandise with former—and possibly current—
student-athletes.11 One scholar claimed that “[i]f Keller is compensated
even a modest amount, the damage to the NCAA (and EA) could
foreseeably be enormous,” giving every athlete ever depicted in NCAA
Football or NCAA March Madness strong precedent for future lawsuits.12
Moreover, the NCAA would be required to pay treble damages under
federal antitrust law.13
Sports columnist Dan Wetzel described one of the plaintiffs as a “sortof Curt Flood of college sports,”14 referencing the potential to revolutionize
the relationship between the NCAA and collegiate athletes.15 It is quite
possible that Sam Keller and Ryan Hart will become the proverbial Curt
Floods of this generation; however, when all is said and done, their
legacies may more closely resemble that of Hugo Zacchini, the “human
cannonball.”16 Zacchini’s landmark case legitimized the right of publicity
and attempted to define the relationship between such a right and the First
4, 2011). The O’Bannon and Keller lawsuits have been consolidated in the Northern District of
California under the name In Re: NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation. Id.
However, the court granted Keller a stay to appeal the district court decision to the Ninth Circuit, which
will be the focus of this Note. Ilardi, supra note 6.
9
Michael McCann, Ryan Hart’s Federal Lawsuit Against Electronic Arts Dismissed, SPORTS L.
BLOG (Sept. 12, 2011, 2:42 PM), http://sports-law.blogspot.com/2011/09/ryan-harts-federal-lawsuitagainst.html.
10
See, e.g., Christian Dennie, Changing the Game: The Litigation that May Be the Catalyst for
Change in Intercollegiate Athletics, 62 SYRACUSE L. REV. 15, 49–50 (2012) (predicting the creation of
a new “modified amateurs” class distinct from student-athletes that will allow certain players to receive
compensation while under the purview of the NCAA).
11
Dan Wetzel, Making NCAA Pay?, YAHOO! SPORTS RIVALS (July 21, 2009),
http://rivals.yahoo.com/ncaa/basketball/news?slug=dw-ncaasuit072109.
12
Bill Cross, Comment, The NCAA as Publicity Enemy Number One, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 1221,
1244 (2010).
13
Andrew B. Carrabis, Strange Bedfellows: How the NCAA and EA Sports May Have Violated
Antitrust and Right of Publicity Laws to Make a Profit at the Exploitation of Intercollegiate
Amateurism, 15 BARRY L. REV. 17, 39 (2010).
14
Wetzel, supra note 11.
15
Curt Flood, a former baseball player, courageously challenged the legality of the reserve clause,
which provided that upon the expiration of a player’s contract, the rights to that player were retained by
his previous team. The Supreme Court refused to strike down the reserve clause, but Marvin Miller
used this case to leverage bargaining power against Major League Baseball in negotiating what we now
call (unrestricted) free agency. Nick Acocella, Sportscentury Biography: Flood of Free Agency, ESPN
CLASSIC, http://espn.go.com/classic/biography/s/flood_curt.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2013).
16
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 563 (1977).
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Amendment. Today, Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. is
still the only right of publicity case ever considered by the Supreme
Court.19 However, the right of publicity is ripe for review, especially
considering the litany of different tests that each circuit has employed to
resolve the right of publicity—First Amendment tension.20
Ironically, the publicity that Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc.21 and Keller
v. Electronic Arts, Inc.22 have received from scholars may help force the
Supreme Court’s hand. These two cases provide the perfect storm for
tackling the right of publicity; we have two district courts considering the
identical issue within the same video game, and yet, the opinions could not
differ more. Keller and Hart’s inconsistency is just a microcosm of the
current state of this jurisprudence, which is begging for the highest court’s
review.23
This Note proposes a test akin to copyright fair use and the
transformative use test applied in both Keller and Hart. These decisions
will illustrate the deficiencies of the current framework and provide an
example of the efficacy of this Note’s proposed test by reconciling the two
opinions. Part II will briefly discuss the background of the right of
publicity chronicling its evolution from an element of the right of privacy
into a distinct property right. Part III will examine the policy justifications
underlying both the right of publicity and the First Amendment. Part IV
will outline the various tests courts have used to balance the right of
publicity against the First Amendment. Part V will focus on the Keller and
Hart decisions, emphasizing the transformative use analysis. Finally, Part
VI will introduce a new test incorporating the copyright fair use doctrine
with new elements designed to advance right of publicity considerations.
II. MORNING WALK-THROUGH:
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
A. The All-Encompassing Right of Privacy
In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis wrote one of the most
influential law review articles in history, The Right to Privacy.24 The
gradual expansion of the right to life justified creation of a “right to enjoy
17

Id. at 565.
Id. at 562.
19
Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 775 (D.N.J. 2011).
20
See infra Part IV.
21
Hart, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 757.
22
No. C 09–1967 CW, 2010 WL 530108 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010).
23
Katie Thomas, Image Rights vs. Free Speech in Video Game Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2010,
at A1 (“I think it’s an area that is crying out for Supreme Court review in the right case.” (quoting
David L. Hudson, Jr.)).
24
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
18
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life,—the right to be let alone.” The initial purpose of this right was to
prevent the press from “overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds
of propriety and of decency.”26 The article had a great impact on American
jurisprudence and did “nothing less than add a chapter to our law.”27
In the wake of the article, courts struggled to accept a new common
law right of privacy and in determining its scope and limitations.28 In
1902, the New York Court of Appeals rejected the adoption of a common
law right to privacy;29 however, the New York legislature responded
swiftly, creating a statute establishing both criminal and civil liability for
the unauthorized use of a person’s “name, portrait or picture” for
“advertising purposes, or for the purposes of trade.”30 Three years later,
the Georgia Supreme Court held that the misappropriation of an artist’s
photograph in an advertisement violated his common law right to
privacy.31 Subsequent opinions32 incorporated the exclusive right to one’s
identity within the right of privacy.33
The aforementioned cases fit comfortably within a “right to be let
alone” since these plaintiffs were exposed to widespread, unwanted
publicity with the potential to cause distress and embarrassment.34
However, when celebrities, athletes, and entertainers claimed emotional
injury for the unauthorized use of their image by advertisers or
merchandisers—creating additional publicity—it raised some eyebrows.35
25
Id. at 93; see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (“[The founders] sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions
and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone—the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”).
26
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 24, at 196.
27
ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN’S LIFE 70 (1946) (quoting Letter from
Roscoe Pound to William Chilton (1916)).
28
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:15 (2d ed. 2012).
29
Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 556 (1902), superseded by statute, N.Y.
Civ. Rights Law §§ 50, 51 (Consol. 2001 & Supp. 2005).
30
N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (Consol. 2001 & Supp. 2005).
31
Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 80–81 (Ga. 1905).
32
See, e.g., Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 195 S.E. 55, 63–64 (N.C. 1938) (holding that
individuals had a right “not only against the scandalous portraiture and display of one’s features and
person, but against the display and use thereof for another’s commercial purposes or gain”); FosterMilburn Co. v. Chinn, 120 S.W. 364, 366 (Ky. 1909) (finding a right against “the publication of the
picture of a person without his consent”); see also Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public
Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 127, 168 (1993) (citing Kunz v. Allen,
172 P. 532, 533 (Kan. 1918) (holding that a right to privacy is “derived from natural law”)).
33
Madow, supra note 32, at 168.
34
Id.
35
See id. at 168–69 (“After all, how could a movie star or professional athlete, who had
deliberately and energetically sought the limelight, complain of embarrassment or hurt feelings when
an advertiser or merchandiser simply gave his face some additional publicity? How could someone
like Babe Ruth, who had performed before thousands, posed for photographs, granted interviews, made
paid public appearances, and endorsed products, complain of distress or humiliation when his picture
was used without his consent on a baseball card or in a cereal advertisement?” (footnote omitted)).
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This type of action did not fit well within the right to privacy since it did
not allege an emotional harm, but rather an economic harm causing
diminished income.36
Understandably, courts were unsympathetic to these celebrity plaintiffs
in the 1920s and 1930s. Many courts held that celebrities “waived their
rights of privacy . . . by assuming positions of prominence and visibility.”37
In O’Brien v. Pabst Sales Co.,38 the Fifth Circuit held that Davey O’Brien,
an All-American college football player, had relinquished his privacy right
by consenting to national media exposure of his on-field prowess and
“repeatedly pos[ing] for photographs for use in publicizing himself and
[his] team.”39 O’Brien alleged that a beer company used his photograph on
a football calendar without his consent.40 Judge Hutcheson had little
sympathy for the star athlete, noting that “the publicity he got was only that
which he had been constantly seeking and receiving.”41
B. Propertizing the Right of Publicity
Widespread reluctance to enforce the commercial misappropriation tort
under the right to privacy umbrella led some lower courts to recognize a
distinct property right in the value of one’s image and likeness.42
However, the Fifth Circuit rejected this notion in Hanna Manufacturing
Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co.43 In this case, Hillerich contracted with
professional baseball players for the “exclusive right” to use their names,
autographs, and photographs in connection with the sale and advertising of
baseball bats.44 Hanna, a competing bat manufacturer, had no agreements
with these players, but nevertheless manufactured bats with similar styles
and name imprints.45 Hillerich sued to enjoin Hanna from selling the bats,
alleging an exclusive property right to use those names on baseball bats.46
36
James M. Treece, Commercial Exploitation of Names, Likenesses, and Personal Histories, 51
TEX. L. REV. 637, 641 (1973).
37
Madow, supra note 32, at 169.
38
124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 823 (1942).
39
Id. at 169.
40
Id. at 168–69.
41
Id. at 170.
42
See, e.g., Munden v. Harris, 134 S.W. 1076, 1078 (Mo. 1911) (“If there is value in [one’s
appearance], sufficient to excite the cupidity of another, why is it not the property of him who gives it
the value and from whom the value springs?”); Edison v. Edison Polyform & Mfg. Co., 67 A. 392, 394
(N.J. Ch. 1907) (“If a man’s name be his own property, as no less an authority than the United States
Supreme Court says, it is difficult to understand why the peculiar cast of one’s features is not also one’s
property, and why its pecuniary value, if it has one, does not belong to its owner rather than to the
person seeking to make an unauthorized use of it.” (citation omitted)).
43
78 F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 645 (1935).
44
Id. at 764.
45
Id.
46
Hillerich sued on two grounds, the second alleging that Hanna’s use of the names falsely
implied an endorsement and thereby constituted unfair competition. Id. at 768. The Fifth Circuit did
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The Fifth Circuit held that Hillerich’s contracts with the players merely
prevented the players from objecting to the use of their names, and that
trademark and unfair competition law governed Hillerich’s rights against
third parties.47 The court reasoned that characterizing the players’ right to
prevent unauthorized use of their names as a “personal” or “property” right
was inconsequential since it was “not vendible in gross so as to pass from
purchaser to purchaser unconnected with any trade or business.”48 More
importantly, the court added, “Fame is not merchandise. It would help
neither sportsmanship nor business to uphold the sale of a famous name to
the highest bidder as property.”49
Eighteen years later, a court finally recognized the economic value of
fame “in addition to and independent of” a right of privacy.50 In the
landmark case Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,51
the Second Circuit held that baseball players have “a right in the publicity
value of [their] photograph.”52 Judge Jerome Frank famously wrote:
This right might be called a “right of publicity.” For it is
common knowledge that many prominent persons (especially
actors and ball-players), far from having their feelings
bruised through public exposure of their likenesses, would
feel sorely deprived if they no longer received money for
authorizing advertisements, popularizing their countenances,
displayed in newspapers, magazines, busses, trains and
subways. This right of publicity would usually yield them no
money unless it could be made the subject of an exclusive
grant which barred any other advertiser from using their
pictures.53
The opinion “essentially propertized the right by averring that it could be
licensed or assigned and enforced against third parties by the licensee or
assignee.”54
Haelan generated a number of different reactions. William Prosser, in
not overturn the district court’s ruling in favor of Hillerich on this claim and ultimately granted an
injunction that would allow Hanna to continue to print the players’ names on the bats under certain
conditions. Id.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 766.
49
Id.
50
Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 816 (1953).
51
Id. at 866.
52
Id. at 868.
53
Id.
54
Gloria Franke, Note, The Right of Publicity vs. the First Amendment: Will One Test Ever
Capture the Starring Role?, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 945, 952 (2006) (citing Haelan Laboratories, Inc., 202
F.2d at 868).
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his immensely influential law review article, Privacy, viewed the phrase
“right of publicity” narrowly, merely signifying a licensee’s exclusive right
to use one’s name and likeness.55 On the other hand, Joseph Grodin—who
later became a justice of the California Supreme Court—recognized the
broader implications of the decision: “[T]he Haelan case gave protection to
persons’ commercial interest in their personality independent of their
privacy interest. . . . If courts wish to protect both interests to at least some
extent, they should do so under separate doctrines, so that limitations
appropriate to each interest may be imposed.”56
This confusion all but vanished when Melville Nimmer exposed the
failure of traditional areas of law to protect the commercial interest in a
person’s identity.57 While the “concept of privacy which Brandeis and
Warren evolved fulfilled the demands of Beacon Street in 1890,” Nimmer
questioned its application to “the needs of Broadway and Hollywood in
1954.”58 Their concern was the preservation of privacy against a press
“overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of
decency.”59 “With the tremendous strides in communications, advertising,
and entertainment techniques, [celebrity] likeness [took] on a pecuniary
value undreamed of at the turn of the century.”60 These cultural and
technological forces necessitated the creation of a right of publicity, an
agenda born by Haelan and subsequently endorsed by Nimmer.61
Courts were initially reluctant to embrace this new right,62 but
ultimately the right of publicity gradually gained widespread judicial and
55
MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 1:26; William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 406
(1960). Prosser’s article divided the tort of invasion of privacy into four separate and distinct
categories, the last of which being “appropriation privacy.” Prosser, supra, at 389. However, he did
not accept the phrasing “right of publicity” because he viewed the tort as protecting both a commercial
and personal dignity interest. Id. at 415. His failure to distinguish between “appropriation privacy”
(injury to dignity and feelings) and commercial misappropriation of one’s identity has led to some
confusion despite many courts referring to this fourth tort as the “right of publicity.” See Carson v.
Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 834 (6th Cir. 1983) (“Henceforth, we will refer to
Prosser’s last, or fourth category, as the ‘right of publicity.’”); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579
F.2d 215, 220 (2d Cir. 1978) (“[Prosser’s fourth category] has in recent years acquired the label ‘right
of publicity.’”).
56
Joseph Grodin, Note, The Right of Publicity: A Doctrinal Innovation, 62 YALE L.J. 1123, 1127,
1130 (1953).
57
See Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 204 (1954)
(surveying the “inadequacy of privacy” as a foundation of a commercial market for “publicity values”
because the law defined privacy as a personal, non-assignable right); id. at 210–12 (analyzing the
inadequacy of unfair competition because “[p]ublicity values of a person or firm may be profitably
appropriated and exploited without the necessity of any imputation that such person or firm is
connected with the exploitation undertaken by the appropriator”).
58
Id. at 203.
59
Id. (quoting Warren & Brandeis, supra note 24, at 196).
60
Id. at 204.
61
Id. at 222–23.
62
Madow, supra note 32, at 176.
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63

scholarly acceptance. It would, however, take another quarter century
before the Supreme Court reviewed this newly established right of
publicity.
III. FILM SESSION: POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
UNDERLYING THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
To formulate a workable test that balances the right of publicity and
the First Amendment, it is appropriate to examine the theoretical
underpinnings of both legal concepts. Scholars and courts have identified
five primary policy justifications for the right of publicity: (1) allowing the
famous to enjoy the fruits of their own labor; (2) preventing unjust
enrichment; (3) providing incentives for creativity; (4) efficient allocation
of property rights; and (5) personal autonomy.64
A. Right of Publicity
1. Lockean Labor Theory
John Locke’s theory asserts that the property right inherent in one’s
self justifies the “right to exclude others from possessing his body and
controlling the output of his labor.”65 Furthermore, “[w]hen a person
‘mixe[s]’ his labor with a thing in its natural (that is unowned) state, he
‘join[s] to it something that is his own’ and ‘thereby makes it his
property.’”66
Arguably the most important contribution by Nimmer was grounding
the right of publicity in the labor theory:
It is . . . unquestionably true that in most instances a person
achieves publicity values of substantial pecuniary worth only
after he has expended considerable time, effort, skill, and
even money. It would seem to be a first principle of Anglo63
See, e.g., Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d 1205, 1207 (8th Cir. 1969) (recognizing that a
professional baseball star could grant an exclusive right to use an imprint of his name to a baseball
manufacturer); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1281 (D. Minn. 1970) (holding that major
league baseball players had a proprietary interest in their names, sporting activities and
accomplishments sufficient to enjoin unauthorized use for commercial purposes).
64
See Jennifer L. Carpenter, Internet Publication: The Case for an Expanded Right of Publicity
for Non-Celebrities, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 3, at *11 (2001) (identifying four of the proffered
justifications); Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE L.J.
383, 411, 417 (1999) (advocating the adoption of the personal autonomy justification for the right of
publicity).
65
Michael Decker, Note, Goodbye, Norma Jean: Marilyn Monroe and the Right of Publicity’s
Transformation at Death, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 243, 257 (2009) (citing Madow, supra note
32, at 175 n.239).
66
Madow, supra note 32, at 175 n.239 (alterations in original) (quoting JOHN LOCKE, THE
SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 17, 19 (Thomas P. Peardon ed., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1952) (1690)).
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American jurisprudence, an axiom of the most fundamental
nature, that every person is entitled to the fruit of his labors
unless there are important countervailing public policy
considerations. . . . [P]ersons who have long and laboriously
nurtured the fruit of publicity values may be deprived of
them, unless judicial recognition is given to what is here
referred to as the right of publicity. . . .67
The Supreme Court echoed this sentiment in Zacchini, finding that “the
[publicity] interest is closely analogous to the goals of patent and copyright
law, focusing on the right of the individual to reap the reward of his
endeavors.”68
Legal scholar Michael Madow rejects this theory contending that
numerous variables contribute to the creation of fame.69 He asserts that “a
celebrity’s public image is always the product of a complex social, if not
fully democratic, process in which the ‘labor’ (time, money, effort) of the
celebrity herself . . . is but one ingredient, and not always the main one.”70
In fact, it is the public, rather than the star, that is responsible for the
creation and molding of the celebrity’s image.71 Fame, therefore, is a
“‘relational’ phenomenon” conferred by the audience and media who
consequently deserve to share in the benefits of the celebrity’s image.72
2. Unjust Enrichment
The Supreme Court articulated another moral rationale: the prevention
of “unjust enrichment by the theft of good will.”73 Professor Harry Kalven
stated that “[n]o social purpose is served by having the defendant get for
free some aspect of the plaintiff that would have market value and for
which he would normally pay.”74 Thus, some have characterized freeriding violators of publicity rights as thieves or hitchhikers.75

67

Nimmer, supra note 57, at 216.
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977); see also Uhlaender v.
Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1282 (D. Minn. 1970) (“A celebrity must be considered to have
invested his years of practice and competition in a public personality which eventually may reach
marketable status. That identity, embodied in his name, likeness, statistics and other personal
characteristics, is the fruit of his labors and is a type of property.” (emphasis added)).
69
Madow, supra note 32, at 183–96.
70
Id. at 195.
71
Franke, supra note 54, at 954.
72
Id.; Madow, supra note 32, at 188.
73
Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576.
74
Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law–Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 331 (1966).
75
Decker, supra note 65, at 260 n.130; see also Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th
Cir. 1988) (describing the defendant’s conduct as being that of “the average thief”); Onassis v.
Christian Dior-N.Y., Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254, 261 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984) (“The commercial hitchhiker
68
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The problem with this theory, like the labor theory, is that the
celebrities are often “reap[ing] what they have not sown” by building upon
the creations of others before them.76 Madow argues that “[c]ultural
production is always . . . a matter of reworking, recombining, and
redeploying already-existing symbolic forms, sounds, narratives, and
images.”77 Locke would counter by arguing that a laborer may justly claim
rights in the value that the transformation added—through the mixing of
his or her labor—to the original property.78 However, it would seem unjust
to allow a celebrity to monopolize the value of this creation since it only
entitles the laborer to the proportionate value transforming the original.79
It follows, then, that it is illogical to prevent use of the celebrity’s image by
parties other than the celebrity (e.g., the media and the public) who play a
role in the creation of his or her public image when the “unauthorized
commercial appropriators oftentimes add something of their own—some
humor, artistry, or wit—to whatever they ‘take,’ and their products may
service markets different from those that the celebrity herself . . . chooses
to service.”80
3. Incentivizing Creation
The incentive justification, espoused in Zacchini, states that
“protection [of publicity rights] provides an economic incentive for [the
performer] to make an investment required to produce a performance of
interest to the public.”81 Conversely, without protecting the value in one’s
identity, there would be no incentive to “expend the time, effort, and
resources necessary to develop talents and produce works that ultimately
benefit society as a whole.”82 In reference to the corresponding policy in
copyright, Chief Justice Bird wrote:
[P]roviding legal protection for the economic value in one’s
identity against unauthorized commercial exploitation creates
a powerful incentive for expending time and resources to
develop the skills or achievements prerequisite to public
recognition . . . . While the immediate beneficiaries are those
who establish professions or identities which are
commercially valuable, the products of their enterprise are
seeking to travel on the fame of another will have to learn to pay the fare or stand on his own two
feet.”).
76
Franke, supra note 54, at 955.
77
Madow, supra note 32, at 196.
78
Decker, supra note 65, at 258 (citing JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT
26 (Thomas P. Peardon ed., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1952) (1690)).
79
Id.
80
Madow, supra note 32, at 204.
81
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977).
82
Madow, supra note 32, at 206.
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often beneficial to society generally. Their performances,
inventions, and endeavors enrich our society.83
Critics of this rationale simply examine how and why one becomes
famous, which reveals the futility of incentives. One of the more obvious
criticisms is that fame existed long before the creation of this right, which
suggests that incentives do not encourage the development of valuable
personas. Madow observed that people could achieve fame in ways
divorced from any investment on behalf of the celebrity including “through
sheer luck, through involvement in public scandal, or through criminal or
grossly immoral conduct.”84 Some athletes and entertainers seek fame for
non-economic purposes like, for example, earning the respect and
admiration of the public.85 Even so, the vast majority of these famous
persons are “very handsomely compensated,” while the right of publicity
merely generates a “collateral source of income.”86 Even a prominent
athlete like Lebron James who makes more than double his player salary in
endorsements each year would consider this income ancillary.87 Thus,
absent a right of publicity, there would be incentives to become famous
separate from collecting royalties from licensing one’s identity.
4. Allocative Efficiency
This theory—a modern tragedy of the commons—dictates that “in a
free market economy, granting individuals exclusive rights to property is
an effective way of allocating scarce resources.”88 Specifically, conferring
a property right to the celebrity will prevent the devaluation of the
commercial value in his or her identity by preventing overexploitation by
the general public.89 Richard Posner argued that publicity rights assure
that advertisers who place the highest value on this exclusive license will

83
Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 441 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
84
Madow, supra note 32, at 179; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46
cmt. c (1995) (“In [some] cases the commercial value acquired by a person’s identity is largely
fortuitous or otherwise unrelated to any investment made by the individual . . . .”).
85
See Franke, supra note 54, at 956 n.80 (“These [non-economic] incentives include the desire
for fame itself, the satisfaction of realizing and exercising one’s talents, the pleasure of winning
people’s applause, inspiring their love and awe, earning their respect and gratitude, and the social and
status rewards that are unique to the modern celebrity.” (citing Madow, supra note 32, at 214)).
86
Madow, supra note 32, at 209.
87
Cf. Decker, supra note 65, at 263 (using the example of Tiger Woods to illustrate this point
(citing Madow, supra note 32, at 210)).
88
MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 2:7 (citing Douglas G. Baird, Common Law Intellectual Property
and the Legacy of International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 411, 414 (1983)).
89
Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 411 (1978).
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purchase that right at market price. Without legal recognition of a right
of publicity, no market or market price exists; rather, the person’s identity
becomes communal property within the public domain.91 The Fifth Circuit
adopted this logic:
[I]f a well-known public figure’s picture could be used freely
to endorse commercial products, the value of his likeness
would disappear. Creating artificial scarcity preserves the
value to him, to advertisers who contract for the use of his
likeness, and in the end, to consumers, who receive
information from the knowledge that he is being paid to
endorse the product.92
This theory rests on the presumption that the value of a celebrity’s
name or likeness diminishes through overuse.93 This may be the case in
advertising after a prolonged period of overuse; however, the opposite may
also prove true where consumers value a product (e.g., a Madonna T-shirt)
simply because “everybody’s got one.”94 This phenomenon, the cultural
network effect, suggests that “a consumer’s utility associated with a good
increases as others also purchase it.”95
Even assuming overuse negatively affects publicity rights, the celebrity
bears those costs, not society at large.96 Unlike the tragedy of the
commons, this does not involve a non-renewable natural resource; the field
of potential celebrities remains abundant despite others losing the
commercial value in their identity.97 “After all, there would be no
‘tragedy’ in the classic parable if the herdsmen, after depleting their
common pasture, could simply move on to another one.”98
5. Personal Autonomy
Legal scholar Alice Haemmerli advocated for the restructuring of the
right of publicity under a new philosophy: Immanuel Kant’s theory on

90
See id. (“There is a perfectly good economic reason for assigning the property right in a
photograph used for advertising purposes to the photographed individual: this assignment assures that
the advertiser to whom the photograph is most valuable will purchase it.”).
91
MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 2:7.
92
Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 438 (5th Cir. 1994).
93
See Decker, supra note 65, at 264 (“The allocative efficiency argument rests on the idea that
celebrity can be depleted by overuse, but, in fact, fame tends to feed on itself.” (citing Madow, supra
note 32, at 188)).
94
Madow, supra note 32, at 221–22.
95
Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
1177, 1212 (2000).
96
Madow, supra note 32, at 224.
97
Decker, supra note 65, at 264.
98
Madow, supra note 32, at 224.
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personal autonomy.
Freedom is the ‘“one sole and original right that
belongs to every human being by virtue of his humanity,’ and it comprises
‘the attribute of a human being’s being his own master.’”100 This notion of
“control and self-determination” implies an individual’s right to control the
use of his or her own persona, since interference causes an infringement of
the innate right of freedom.101
In Kant’s view, “property is inseparably associated with one’s
‘personhood’ because property grows out of freedom and freedom is
essential to personhood.”102 Property is an extension of freedom; therefore,
the person should have the exclusive right to use his image and control the
objectification of that image as his own property.103 Haemmerli saw
Kant’s philosophy as a means to reconcile the moral and economic
characteristics of the right of publicity rather than “mak[ing] a
dichotomous choice between a privacy right concerned with moral
injury . . . or a purely pecuniary publicity right.”104
This theory seems to “enhance[] the autonomy and personality
interests of one person only by harming the interests of another.”105 An
expansive right of publicity will inevitably chill speech, particularly
expression involving the most popular celebrities since they are “the
easiest to evoke without resorting to obvious means such as name,
likeness, or voice.”106 The Kantian approach erroneously implies that a
celebrity is morally entitled to deny the public the ability to express
themselves by protecting his own reciprocal interest.107 Furthermore, the
personal autonomy justification fails to contemplate the transition from the
tort-based right of privacy to the economic right of publicity.108 Legal
scholars Dogan and Lemley argued that courts and scholars abandoned the
human dignity rationale in favor of labor-based moral rights to allocate
revenue to the celebrity for his or her commercial exploitation.109
99

Haemmerli, supra note 64, at 414.
Id. (quoting IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 44 (John Ladd
trans. & ed., Library of Liberal Arts 1965) (1797)).
101
Id. at 416.
102
Id. at 418.
103
Id. at 418–21.
104
Id. at 422.
105
Steven Semeraro, Property’s End: Why Competition Policy Should Limit the Right of
Publicity, 43 CONN. L. REV. 753, 780 (2011); see also White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d
1512, 1521 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“In the name of avoiding the ‘evisceration’ of a
celebrity’s rights in her image, the majority diminishes the rights of copyright holders and the public at
large. In the name of fostering creativity, the majority suppresses it.”).
106
White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992), cert denied, 508 U.S.
951 (1993).
107
Semeraro, supra note 105, at 780.
108
Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn from Trademark
Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1180–81 (2006).
109
Semeraro, supra note 105, at 781; Dogan & Lemley, supra note 108, at 1182.
100
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B. The First Amendment
The First Amendment safeguards freedom of speech and expression in
our society. Two frequently cited justifications for the First Amendment
are: (1) The fostering of a “free marketplace of ideas” essential to a
democratic society; and (2) “fulfill[ing] the human need for selfexpression”110
To achieve these goals, the Supreme Court has extended the
constitutional protections of the First Amendment to entertainment.111
Justice Reed explained, “The line between the informing and the
entertaining is too elusive . . . . What is one man’s amusement, teaches
With this quote, entertainment entered the
another’s doctrine.”112
proverbial free marketplace of ideas as another form of expression. The
Court has also explicitly endorsed protecting various forms of selfexpression, stating, “[t]he actor on stage or screen, the artist whose creation
is in oil or clay or marble, the poet whose reading public may be
practically nonexistent, the musician and his musical scores . . . are [all]
beneficiaries of freedom of expression.”113
The right of publicity will inevitably conflict with both of these First
Amendment purposes in certain circumstances. Madow soundly points out
that individuals and groups use celebrity images in their everyday lives to
produce “meanings of their own making.”114 Thus, it is essential that the
public be able to use the celebrity’s persona freely and creatively without
the risk of censorship, or more importantly, self-censorship.115 Their
images are “widely used—far more than are institutionally anchored
elites—to symbolize individual aspirations, group identities, and cultural
values.”116 Giving celebrities absolute control over their identities would
facilitate private censorship of popular culture, inhibiting both creative
processes and freedom of expression.
The sphere of protected expression shrinks significantly in the context
of commercial speech, or “speech that does ‘no more than propose a

110
Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. the First Amendment: A Property and
Liability Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47, 66 (1994) [hereinafter “Kwall I”]. A third justification—
guarding against violent societal eruptions by providing meaningful vehicles of expression—is not
particularly relevant to the right of publicity. Id.
111
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948).
112
Id.
113
Kwall I, supra note 110, at 67 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 514 (1961) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting)).
114
Madow, supra note 32, at 143.
115
Id. at 146.
116
Franke, supra note 54, at 959 (quoting Madow, supra note 32, at 128).
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commercial transaction.’”
For example, the Third Circuit held that the
use of a thirteen-second audio of narrator John Facenda in a half-hour
“Making of Madden NFL ‘06” video was commercial speech because its
sole purpose was to promote EA’s Madden NFL ‘06 video game.118 While
the First Amendment affords a degree of protection to commercial speech,
it is significantly less than that enjoyed by political and entertaining
speech.119 Thus, the right of publicity will, in most instances, trump an
advertiser’s right to use a celebrity’s image.
However, the line between expressive and commercial speech is far
from clear.120 This confusion arises because the First Amendment “is not
limited to those who publish without charge and an expressive activity
does not lose its constitutional protection merely because it is undertaken
for a profit.”121 Thus, expressive speech that contains commercial
elements presents a problem that has plagued the variety of balancing
techniques employed to resolve the struggle between the right of publicity
and the First Amendment.
These doctrinal justifications provide the groundwork for balancing the
right of publicity against the First Amendment. Understanding these
justifications can help create a proper mechanism to resolve the tension
between these doctrines—a task that lower courts have struggled with due
to the lack of guidance from one particular Supreme Court case.
IV. PRE-GAME WARM-UP:
ESTABLISHED FIRST AMENDMENT BALANCING TESTS
A. Zacchini & “The Entire Act” Standard
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., the only Supreme
Court case addressing the right of publicity,122 involved a local television
station that recorded a human cannonball’s entire act without his

117
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771–72 n.24
(1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385
(1973)).
118
Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1015–18 (3d Cir. 2008).
119
Kwall I, supra note 110, at 68. False or misleading commercial speech is afforded no
protection. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 563–
64 (1980); see also id. at 561–62 (“Commercial expression not only serves the economic interest of the
speaker, but also assists consumers and furthers the societal interest in the fullest possible
dissemination of information.”).
120
See Franke, supra note 54, at 960 (noting that “the fact that a lot of expressive speech contains
commercial elements” creates a great deal of confusion).
121
Id. (citing Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 459 (Cal. 1979)); see also
Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 307, 315 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (explaining that
profit motive alone does not make speech “commercial”).
122
Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 775 (D.N.J. 2011).
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permission and broadcast it on the evening news.
Zacchini claimed a
misappropriation of his act while the television station claimed First
Amendment protection for the news broadcast.124 To begin, the Court
explicitly recognized a right of publicity as a separate cause of action from
the right of privacy.125 The Court added:
The rationale for [protecting the right of publicity] is the
straightforward one of preventing unjust enrichment by the
theft of good will. No social purpose is served by having the
defendant get free some aspect of the plaintiff that would
have market value and for which he would normally pay.126
Although the Court recognized this right, it was seemingly at odds
with free speech considerations. Even so, the Supreme Court held that
Zacchini’s interest in protecting the economic value of his “entire act”
outweighed the television station’s First Amendment prerogative to
disseminate newsworthy information.127 The Court attempted to apply a
balancing test; however, the decision failed to provide guidance for lower
courts to apply the test in the future.128 The Court stated, “Wherever the
line in particular situations is to be drawn between media reports that are
protected and those that are not, we are quite sure that the First and
Fourteenth Amendments do not immunize the media when they broadcast
a performer’s entire act without his consent.”129
Many courts have attempted to limit Zacchini’s application to its facts;
particularly where a defendant appropriates a performer’s entire act, courts
find a violation of the right of publicity without engaging in any balancing
with the First Amendment.130 Thus, while many have overanalyzed
Zacchini over the years, no test has effectively resolved the conflict

123

433 U.S. 562, 563–64 (1977).
Id. at 564.
125
Id. at 573.
126
Id. at 576 (alteration in original) (quoting Kalven, supra note 74, at 331).
127
Id. at 575.
128
Lower courts have analyzed Zacchini as employing a balancing test weighing the right of
publicity and the First Amendment. See C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg, Inc. v. Major League Baseball
Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 823 (8th Cir. 2007) (“The Supreme Court [in Zacchini] has
directed that state law rights of publicity must be balanced against first amendment considerations.”
(citing 433 U.S. at 562)).
129
Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 574–75.
130
Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 775 (D.N.J. 2011); see, e.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh
Pub., Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 956 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Zacchini has been criticized as being very ‘narrowly
drawn’ in that it involved the wholesale reproduction of a live ‘entire act.’”). The decision may even
suggest that Zacchini applies only to performances, rather than the misappropriation of one’s identity.
See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576 (“[T]his case . . . involv[es], not the appropriation of an entertainer’s
reputation to enhance the attractiveness of a commercial product, but the appropriation of the very
activity by which the entertainer acquired his reputation in the first place.”).
124
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between the First Amendment and the right of publicity.
Despite the lack of guidance from Zacchini, lower courts and scholars
have attempted to devise tests to perfect the balance of these two rights.132
To date, there are at least five different approaches: (1) fair use; (2) the
transformative use test; (3) the predominant use test; (4) the Restatement
approach; and (5) general ad hoc balancing.
B. The Fair Use Defense
Several commentators have advocated the adoption of a modified
version of copyright’s “fair use” test to analyze First Amendment defenses
in right of publicity cases.133 Defendants in copyright suits often assert a
“fair use”134 of the copyrighted material, or “a privilege in others than the
owner of a copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable
manner without his consent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted to the
[owner of the copyright.]”135
The fair use doctrine drew criticism as “the most troublesome in the
whole law of copyright”136 and “entirely equitable and . . . so flexible as
virtually to defy definition.”137 Nonetheless, the doctrine has produced
general agreement about which factors apply and how to weigh such
factors.138 Although fair use has posed issues in close cases, courts have
little difficulty applying it in the majority of cases, and “there is sufficient
consensus about the parameters of fair use to give rise to scholarly
scoldings when courts on occasion misuse the doctrine.”139
131
Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, A Perspective on Human Dignity, the First Amendment, and the
Right of Publicity, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 1345, 1356–57 (2009) [hereinafter “Kwall II”]. Even Justice
Powell, in dissent, recognized that the “entire act” standard had little precedential value for application
to future publicity cases. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 579 n.1 (Powell, J., dissenting).
132
Kwall II, supra note 131, at 1357.
133
See, e.g., Haemmerli, supra note 64, at 466 (advocating that application of a fair use test to the
right of publicity “is a sound idea” despite differences between copyright and publicity rights); Randall
T.E. Coyne, Toward a Modified Fair Use Defense in Right of Publicity Cases, 29 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 781, 815–20 (1988) (applying a modified fair use doctrine to right of publicity cases to promote
the twin policies underlying that right: promoting creativity and preventing unjust enrichment); Pamela
Samuelson, Reviving Zacchini: Analyzing First Amendment Defenses in Right of Publicity and
Copyright Cases, 57 TUL. L. REV. 836, 915 (1983) (delineating a modified fair use standard applicable
to right of publicity cases); Douglas G. Baird, Note, Human Cannonballs and the First Amendment:
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 30 STAN. L. REV. 1185, 1206 (1978) (“Accommodation
of the competing interests of the press and performers requires a tool of mediation analogous to fair
use.”).
134
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
135
Samuelson, supra note 133, at 884 (alteration in original) (citing HORACE G. BALL, THE LAW
OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944)).
136
Id. at 885 (quoting Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939)).
137
Id. (quoting Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)).
138
Id.
139
Id. Cf. Douglas J. Ellis, Comment, The Right of Publicity and the First Amendment: A
Comment on Why Celebrity Parodies Are Fair Game for Fair Use, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 575, 612 (1996)
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Samuelson urged the application of a two-tiered fair use test based on a
broad interpretation of Zacchini’s holding.140 The first step assesses the
“substantiality of the property interest” and the “degree of impairment . . .
from the appropriation of the right.”141 In doing so, the factors to consider
would include:
1. The purpose and character of the appropriator’s use
of the publicity right, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for non-profit purposes;
2. The nature of the asserted publicity right;
3. The amount and substantiality of the appropriation of
the publicity right by the defendant; and
4. The effect of the defendant’s appropriation upon the
potential market for or value of the publicity right.142
If, upon application of these factors, fair use is not established, the
presumption is that the First Amendment does not outweigh the
“impingement on a substantial property right.”143
However, “this
presumption could be overcome by proof that access to the protected
matter was necessary to achieve the dissemination of information and
public debate objectives which underlie the [F]irst [A]mendment.”144
Haemmerli reformulated this second step to ask whether “access is
necessary as a matter of artistic expression to permit individuals and
groups to ‘play with’ meaning and to come up with new ways of recoding
cultural icons, or whether these needs can be satisfactorily fulfilled in
alternative ways without invading conflicting property rights.”145 In other
words, “Is the use necessary to achieve the public information, public
discourse, or self-realization goals that underlie the First Amendment?”146
Many disapproved of these proposals to adopt a modified fair use test.
At the most basic level, the assumption that fair use internally
accommodates copyright to the First Amendment may be erroneous.147

(“Despite a certain amount of ambiguity in its factors and the tendency of courts to misapply them,
copyright’s fair use doctrine provides a relatively stable and succinct method of analysis for parody
defenses to the right of publicity.”).
140
Samuelson, supra note 133, at 858, 915–16.
141
Id. at 915.
142
Id.
143
Id. at 916.
144
Id.
145
Haemmerli, supra note 64, at 471 (internal quotation marks omitted).
146
Franke, supra note 54, at 969 (quoting Haemmerli, supra note 64, at 471).
147
The Supreme Court has suggested that the idea/expression dichotomy actually balances
copyright and free speech interests. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539, 556 (1985) (noting that the idea/expression dichotomy “strike[s] a definitional balance
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Additionally, the test, formulated for copyright law, fails to address an
important rationale of the right of publicity grounded in trademark law,
consumer protection.148 No court has adopted this test, and one has even
rejected a wholesale importation of fair use into the right of publicity.149
C. The Transformative Use Test
Though many disfavored using a blanket copyright fair use test, courts
have used the first fair use factor, “the purpose and character of the use,” in
right of publicity cases.150 The transformative use test weighs First
Amendment protection for expression against a person’s right of publicity
by determining “whether the [person’s] likeness is one of the ‘raw
materials’ from which an original work is synthesized, or whether the
depiction or imitation of the [person] is the very sum and substance of the
work in question.”151
The Supreme Court of California first articulated the transformative
use test in Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc.152 In this
case, the plaintiff, owner of all rights associated with “The Three Stooges,”
sought damages and injunctive relief for the reproduction of the comedians
on charcoal drawings and lithographs.153 In applying the test, the court
reasoned that:
When artistic expression takes the form of a literal depiction
or imitation of a celebrity for commercial gain, directly
trespassing on the right of publicity without adding
significant expression beyond that trespass, the state law
interest in protecting the fruits of artistic labor outweighs the
expressive interests of the imitative artist. . . . [However],
when a work contains significant transformative elements, it
is not only especially worthy of First Amendment protection,
but it is also less likely to interfere with the economic interest
protected by the right of publicity.154
The court concluded that the Three Stooges’ likenesses was not “one of the
‘raw materials’ from which [the] original work [was] synthesized,” but
between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts while
still protecting an author’s expression” (quoting 723 F.2d 195, 203 (2d Cir. 1983))).
148
Kwall I, supra note 110, at 61.
149
See, e.g., Cardtoons v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 964, 972 (10th Cir.
1996) (rejecting the district court’s use of the entire copyright fair use defense in favor of balancing the
right of publicity against the First Amendment).
150
Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal. 2001).
151
Id. at 809.
152
Id.
153
Id. at 800.
154
Id. at 808 (footnote omitted).
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rather “the very sum and substance of the work,” in violation of their rights
of publicity.155
The Ninth Circuit observed that decisions applying the transformative
use test represent a spectrum; on one end, Comedy III represents a blatant
infringement, and on the other, Winter v. DC Comics156 represents a
substantial transformation.157 In this case, the comic book “Jonah Hex”
depicted well-known musicians, Johnny and Edgar Winter, as villainous
half-worm, half-human offspring that bore their distinctive pale faces and
long white hair.158 After stating that the application of the test was “not
difficult,”159 the court concluded that the comic book characters were not
“conventional depictions,” but contained “significant expressive content”
beyond mere reproductions of the plaintiffs’ likenesses.160
Somewhere in the middle of this spectrum falls ETW Corp. v. Jireh
Publishing, Inc.161 In this case, Tiger Woods’s licensing agent sued artist
Rick Rush for creating and selling a painting featuring Woods’s likeness
celebrating victory at the 1997 Masters Tournament in Augusta,
Georgia.162 The painting also included a panorama of golf legends,
including Arnold Palmer and Jack Nicklaus, in the background observing
Woods’s triumph.163 The Sixth Circuit emphasized that the painting did
not “capitalize solely on a literal depiction of Woods” because the artist
added “a significant creative component of his own to Woods’s
identity.”164 The emphasis was not on the reproduction of Woods, but
rather the transformative “message that Woods himself will someday join
that revered group” of legendary golfers,165 which entitled it to the full
protection of the First Amendment.166
Two cases applying the transformative use test to video games were
particularly informative in the Keller and Hart decisions.167 In Kirby v.
Sega of America, Inc.,168 the California Court of Appeals held that a video
155

Id. at 809.
69 P.3d 473 (Cal. 2003).
157
Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 580 F.3d 874, 890 (9th Cir. 2009).
158
Winter, 69 P.3d at 476.
159
Id. at 479.
160
Id. Cf. Mine O’Mine, Inc. v. Calmese, No. 2:10-CV-00043-KJD-PAL, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
75236, at *23 (D. Nev. July 12, 2011) (finding the character “Shaqtus”—a half-human, half-cactus
cartoon of basketball star Shaquille O’Neal—to be just as sufficiently transformative as the cartoon
images of the Winter brothers).
161
332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003).
162
Id. at 918.
163
Id.
164
Id. at 938.
165
Id. at 936.
166
Id. at 938.
167
See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 782 (D.N.J. 2011) (asserting that Kirby and
No Doubt are instructive in that both applied the transformative use test in the video game context).
168
50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
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game character fashioned after a celebrity singer’s appearance and style
was sufficiently transformative for full free speech protection.169 Kirby
was a 1990s singer known for the phrase “ooh la la,” which also resembled
the name of the alleged character imitation, “Ulala.”170 Also, like Kirby,
the character wore platform shoes, had similar facial features and hair
color, and wore attire like that worn by the singer.171 However, Ulala
differed from Kirby in physique based, in part, on the use of the Japanesestyle animation form of anime.172 The court also noted that the setting for
the game, a twenty-fifth century space age, and her corresponding
futuristic occupation as a space-reporter were unique; and altogether, it
amounted to a sufficient transformation.173
In the second case, the rock-band No Doubt sued the developer of the
Band Hero video game for exceeding the bounds of the parties’ licensing
agreement.174 Band Hero included avatars designed to resemble the band
members’ likenesses with great detail.175 Ruling in favor of No Doubt, the
court held that the game was not transformative, reasoning that:
[The developer] intentionally used . . . literal reproductions,
so that players could choose to “be” the No Doubt rock stars.
The game does not permit players to alter the No Doubt
avatars in any respect; they remain at all times immutable
images of the real celebrity musicians . . . .176
The court further noted that these avatars are unlike the character in Kirby
because the avatars were not “fanciful, creative characters.”177
The transformative use test has earned a fair amount of critics since its
inception.178 Eugene Volokh criticized Comedy III’s varying definitions of
transformation, which borrowed language from copyright law and fair
169

Id. at 617.
Id. at 609–10.
171
Id. at 610–11.
172
Id. at 616.
173
Id. at 610; see also id. at 618 (“As in Winter, Ulala is a ‘fanciful, creative character’ who exists
in the context of a unique and expressive video game. Similar facts distinguished Winter from Comedy
III, and the same distinction applies here. [Respondents’] portrayal of Ulala is protected by the First
Amendment.” (quoting the trial court)).
174
No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g., Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397, 401 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
175
Id.
176
Id. at 409–10.
177
Id. at 410.
178
See, e.g., Mark S. Lee, Agents of Chaos: Judicial Confusion in Defining the Right of PublicityFree Speech Interface, 23 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 471, 493 (2003) (noting that the transformative use
test has proven to be problematic); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Right of Publicity, 40
HOUS. L. REV. 903, 914–25 (2003) (engaging in a detailed analysis of the problems with the
transformative use test); Schuyler M. Moore, Sex, Lies, and Videotape: The First Amendment vs. the
Right of Publicity for Expressive Works, 25 ENT. L. REP., Nov. 2003, at 8–10 (enumerating several
arguments that prove the transformative use test unworkable).
170
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use.
Even the Comedy III court called the distinction between protected
and unprotected expression “subtle,” providing a vague standard with little
predictive value.180 Another critic, Schuyler Moore, even questioned the
logic and First Amendment rationale behind justifying protection for
“transformative” works, but not “non-transformative” works.181 Despite
these criticisms, both district courts found this test appropriate to apply in
Keller and Hart.
D. The Predominant Use Test
In Doe v. TCI Cablevision,182 the Supreme Court of Missouri rejected
the transformative use test in favor of a “more balanced balancing test.”183
The test states:
If a product is being sold that predominantly exploits the
commercial value of an individual’s identity, that product
should be held to violate the right of publicity and not be
protected by the First Amendment, even if there is some
“expressive” content in it that might qualify as “speech” in
other circumstances. If, on the other hand, the predominant
purpose of the product is to make an expressive comment on
or about a celebrity, the expressive values could be given
greater weight.184
A former hockey player, Anthony “Tony” Twist, sued Todd
McFarlane, the creator of the Spawn comic series, for the improper use of
his name and likeness.185 McFarlane named a mafia don in his comic
series “Anthony ‘Tony Twist’ Twistelli,” but the character bore no
resemblance to the hockey player aside from the name and “reputation as a
tough-guy enforcer.”186 Despite these dissimilarities, the court held that
“the use and identity of Twist’s name has become predominantly a ploy to
sell comic books and related products rather than an artistic or literary
expression . . . .”187
The problem with this test is evident; how does one distinguish
between a predominantly commercial or expressive purpose “when the two
go hand in hand?”188 Mark Lee, the creator of the predominant use test,
179

Volokh, supra note 177, at 916–17.
Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 811 (Cal. 2001).
181
Moore, supra note 177, at 10.
182
110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
183
Id. at 374.
184
Id. (citing Lee, supra note 177, at 500).
185
Id. at 365.
186
Id. at 365–66.
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Id. at 374.
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Moore, supra note 177, at 13.
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suggested that other judicial approaches like the “merchandise v. media”
distinction,189 the “alternative means” test,190 the Restatement’s
“unrelatedness” test,191 and the “transformative use” test192 could assist in
determining whether the predominant purpose is exploitative or
expressive.193 However, even Lee concedes that these various approaches
are “individually unsatisfying or incomplete,”194 so it is questionable why
they should guide the analysis of a more comprehensive approach.195
Perhaps even more disconcerting is the test’s reliance on commercial
success. Lee’s example reveals this defect: “If people buy a picture of
Tiger Woods predominantly because they like Tiger Woods, rather than
because they are attracted to the composition of the picture, that picture
should be deemed to violate Tiger Woods’s right of publicity.”196 The
Tiger Woods example illustrates that “if [a] product receives commercial
success because of the individual’s identity, that is the end of the analysis
and the First Amendment is not available.”197 Such a test would chill
artistic endeavors and free speech, especially for works that include very
famous celebrities or athletes that would garner commercial success
regardless of the amount of expression.
E. The Restatement Approach
The Third Restatement of Unfair Competition provides that “if the
name or likeness is used solely to attract attention to a work that is not
related to the identified person, the user may be subject to liability for a use
of the other’s identity in advertising.”198 Also known as the “relatedness”
189
See Lee, supra note 177, at 500 (“For example, the ‘merchandise v. media’ [distinction] can be
a practical shortcut to quickly resolve the issue in many circumstances. While one could argue that a
bumper sticker, swizzle stick, bobblehead doll, or poster includes some expressive content, most often
they predominately are intended to capitalize on the commercial value of an individual’s
identity . . . .”).
190
See id. at 500–01 (“The ‘alternative means’ test can also help a court assess whether publicity
rights are being exploited by determining whether the taking of intellectual property could have been
avoided in the first place. An unnecessary use is more likely to be an exploitive, and hence actionable,
use of the publicity right.”).
191
See id. at 501 (“The Restatement’s ‘unrelatedness’ test can also help evaluate whether use of
an individual’s identity in a work of expression is appropriate by helping to assess whether the use was
intended to make a genuine comment about or merely to exploit the goodwill of the celebrity.”).
192
See id. (“[T]he California Supreme Court’s [transformative use] test can help to determine
whether the use is primarily exploitative or communicative by encouraging judicial focus on the nature
of the use.”).
193
Franke, supra note 54, at 975 (citing Lee, supra note 177, at 500–01).
194
Lee, supra note 177, at 500.
195
See Franke, supra note 54, at 975–76 (noting the pitfalls of the “merchandise v. media”
distinction, the “alternative means” test, and the Restatement approach).
196
Lee, supra note 177, at 500.
197
Franke, supra note 54, at 976.
198
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 cmt. c (1995).
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test, it essentially “protects the use of another person’s name or identity in
a work that is ‘related to’ that person.”199 The scope of “related uses” is
broad, including:
[T]he use of a person’s name or likeness in news reporting
. . . use in entertainment and other creative works, including
both fiction and nonfiction . . . [use] as part of an article
published in a fan magazine or in a feature story broadcast on
an entertainment program . . . dissemination of an
unauthorized print or broadcast biography . . . [and u]se of
another’s identity in a novel, play or motion picture . . . .200
This approach, while attempting to distinguish between expressive and
commercial speech, fails to consider that many uses of a person’s identity
are both expressive and commercial.201 Though these tests purport to
balance the right of publicity and First Amendment, the inquiry ends once
the use is determined to be expressive.202 For this reason, many courts
have applied the transformative use or predominant use test as a better
balancing mechanism.
F. Ad Hoc Balancing
The least structured approach involves a “case-by-case weighing of
competing values and interests to determine whether ‘speech’ in a
particular case is deserving of constitutional immunity from legal
liability.”203 The Tenth Circuit was the first to employ such an analysis in
Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Association.204 The
court held that Cardtoons’ rights to produce and sell parody baseball
trading cards outweighed the baseball players’ rights of publicity.205 Judge
Tacha balanced these rights by weighing the “importance of Cardtoons’
right to free expression and the consequences of limiting that right” against
“the effect of infringing on MLBPA’s right of publicity.”206
More recently, the Eighth Circuit applied the ad hoc balancing test in
C.B.C. Distribution & Marketing, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced
Media, L.P.207 C.B.C. sought declaratory judgment that it had a right to
use the names and statistics of major league baseball players in its fantasy

199

Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 373 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 cmt. c (1995).
201
Doe, 110 S.W.3d at 374.
202
Id.
203
MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 8.23.
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95 F.3d 959, 972 (10th Cir. 1996).
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Id. at 976.
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Id. at 972.
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208

sports products.
Advanced Media, a competing fantasy sports provider,
filed a counterclaim arguing that this violated the players’ rights of
publicity, to which it had obtained a license.209 The court held that
C.B.C.’s First Amendment rights in offering its fantasy baseball products
superseded the players’ right of publicity.210
McCarthy pejoratively characterized this as an “I know it when I see
it” approach.211 Furthermore, “there is no rule to be applied, there is only
unrestrained and unpredictable judicial balancing of competing values.”212
This approach has not secured widespread application despite its basic
balancing of a commercial right to one’s identity against freedom of
expression.
The myriad tests fail to give courts a principled and consistent method
of resolving the frequent interaction of the right of publicity and the First
Amendment. The lack of uniformity creates difficulty in counseling
clients, fails to provide predictable standards, and promotes forum
shopping.
Most troubling, however, are the inconsistent results
exemplified by the Keller and Hart opinions.
V. THE PUBLICITY BOWL:
KELLER AND THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY VERSUS
HART AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Keller and Hart demonstrate that the balancing of the right of the
publicity and the First Amendment—even when considering the same
medium—can produce contrary results. In both cases, former college
football players sued the same video game manufacturer alleging nearly
identical facts. These cases substantiate the need to create a uniform,
unambiguous standard to protect the right of publicity while maintaining a
robust public domain.
A. Keller v. Electronic Arts, Inc.
In 2010, Samuel Keller, a former quarterback for both Arizona State
University and the University of Nebraska, filed a lawsuit against EA, the

208

Id. at 820.
Id.
210
Id. at 824. The court relied on a number of factors including: (1) the information CBC used
was already in the public domain; (2) courts have “recognized the public value of information about the
game of baseball and its players”; and (3) the economic interests of the players was not nearly as strong
since they already receive a great deal of compensation. Kwall II, supra note 131, at 1362 n.111 (citing
C.B.C. Distribution & Marketing, 505 F.3d at 823–24).
211
MCCARTHY, supra note 28, § 8.23 (internal quotation marks omitted).
212
Id.
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NCAA, and the CLC in the Northern District of California.
Sam Keller
graduated from San Ramon High in 2003 as the ninth-best quarterback
prospect in the nation.214 After three years at Arizona State, Keller
transferred to Nebraska where he set the school’s single-season records for
completion percentage (63.1%) and passing yards per game (269.1).215
Like many before him,216 Keller had a brief stint in the NFL; he was
waived less than a month after signing with the Oakland Raiders.217
EA develops interactive entertainment software including the NCAA
Football series of video games.218 NCAA Football allows consumers to
simulate football games between more than 120 NCAA teams.219 Keller
alleged that, “to make the games realistic, EA designs the virtual football
players to resemble real-life college football athletes, including himself.”220
These virtual players share “the same jersey numbers,” the “same home
state,” the same “physical characteristics” (including height and weight),
and play the same positions as their real-life counterparts.221 Although EA
omits the athletes’ names from the game, consumers may simply download
team rosters and upload them into the game with ease.222
Keller alleged that EA and the NCAA violated his common law,
California,223 and Indiana224 rights of publicity.225 He also alleged that the
NCAA and CLC conspired to facilitate this unauthorized use of his
likeness during a meeting with EA to negotiate agreements involving the

213

Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. C 09–1967 CW, 2010 WL 530108, at *1–2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8,

2010).
214
Player Bio: Sam Keller, HUSKERS.COM, http://www.huskers.com/ViewArticle.dbml?DB_OE
M_ID=100&ATCLID=866801 (last visited Mar. 13, 2013).
215
Id.
216
See NFL Hopeful FAQs: How Long Do Most NFL Careers Last?, NFL PLAYERS ASS’N.,
https://www.nflplayers.com/About-us/FAQs/NFL-Hopeful-FAQs/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2013) (“The
average length of an NFL career is about 3 and a half seasons. . . . Players leave the game because of
injury, self-induced retirement, or being cut by the team.”).
217
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Raiders Sign Rookie QB Keller, Waive QB Meyer, NFL.COM (June 25,
2008, 7:45 PM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/09000d5d80902d4c/article/raiders-sign-rookie-qbkeller-waive-qb-meyer;
Transactions:
2008–2009,
NFLHUSKERS.COM,
http://nflhuskers.com/transactions0809.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2013).
218
Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 530108, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8,
2010); see also Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 760 (D.N.J. 2011) (noting that there are
over 100 college football teams in NCAA Football).
219
Id.
220
Id.
221
Id.; see also id. (“To enhance the accuracy of the player depictions, [Keller] alleges, EA sends
questionnaires to team equipment managers of college football teams.”).
222
Id.
223
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West 2012).
224
IND. CODE § 32-36-1-8 (2012).
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See Keller, 2010 WL 530108, at *1–2 (noting that EA is a Delaware corporation with its
principal place of business in California and that NCAA’s headquarters are located in Indiana).
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NCAA Football video game.
The court first listed the elements of a common law right of publicity
claim: “(1) the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s identity; (2) the
appropriation of plaintiff’s name or likeness to defendant’s advantage,
commercially, or otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and (4) resulting
injury.”227 Invoking the transformative use test, the court stated that a
work is “protected by the First Amendment inasmuch as it contains
significant transformative elements or that the value of the work does not
derive primarily from the celebrity’s fame.”228
Relying heavily upon Comedy III, the court described the main inquiry
as:
[W]hether the celebrity likeness is one of the “raw materials”
from which an original work is synthesized, or whether the
depiction or imitation of the celebrity is the very sum and
substance of the work in question. We ask, in other words,
whether a product containing a celebrity’s likeness is so
transformed that it has become primarily the defendant’s own
expression rather than the celebrity’s likeness. And when we
use the word “expression,” we mean expression of something
other than the likeness of the celebrity.229
As discussed above,230 the court then recognized two California
Supreme Court cases that “‘bookend the spectrum’ used to measure a
work’s transformative nature.”231 At one end, Comedy III provides an
example of a non-transformative work, while Winter offers the opposite
end finding a sufficient transformation.232 Using these two cases as
guideposts, the court used Kirby as a middling example of the
transformative use test applied to a video game.233
Considering this precedent, the court held that the depiction of Keller
was not sufficiently transformative to provide First Amendment
protection.234 The court reasoned that Keller “is represented as what he
was: the starting quarterback for Arizona State” with the “same jersey
number, . . . the same height and weight and hail[ing] from the same
226

Id.
Id. at *3 (quoting Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 580 F.3d 874, 889 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). “Although the statutory and common law rights are similar . . . to state a
claim under section 3344, a plaintiff must prove knowing use in addition to satisfying the elements of a
common law claim.” Id.
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Id. (quoting Hilton, 580 F.3d at 889) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Id. at *4 (quoting Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 809 (Cal. 2001)).
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See supra Part IV.C.
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Keller, 2010 WL 530108, at *4 (quoting Hilton, 580 F.3d at 890–91).
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Id.
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state.”
Furthermore, unlike in Kirby, “the game’s setting is identical to
where the public found [Keller] during his collegiate career: on the football
field.”236
Most importantly, the court rejected EA’s assertion “that the video
game, taken as a whole, contains transformative elements.”237 Recognizing
that precedent did not support this argument, the court added:
In Winter, the court focused on the depictions of the
plaintiffs, not the content of the other portions of the comic
book. The court in Kirby did the same: it compared Ulala
with the plaintiff; its analysis did not extend beyond the
game’s elements unrelated to Ulala. These cases show that
this [c]ourt’s focus must be on the depiction of [Keller] in
“NCAA Football,” not the game’s other elements.238
As of the writing of this Note, EA’s appeal to the Ninth Circuit is still
pending.239
B. Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc.
Alleging very similar facts, Ryan Hart, a former Rutgers University
quarterback, brought a putative class action suit against EA in the District
of New Jersey.240 Hart alleged unauthorized use of his likeness in NCAA
Football 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2009, in violation of his common law right
of publicity.241 With respect to NCAA Football 2006, Hart had identical
allegations to Keller about the realistic portrayal of the virtual players.242
However, Hart added that the virtual players had identical accessories,
including a left wristband and helmet visor, and player ratings that
reflected actual footage of him during his 2005 college season.243
EA filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that the First
Amendment bars Hart’s right of publicity claim because the NCAA
Football video games constitute protected expressive works.244 Hart
disagreed, contending that the game signified speech made for commercial
235

Id.
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
239
See Davis v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 10–03328 RS, 2012 WL 3860819, at *5 n.6 (N.D. Cal. Mar.
29, 2012) (stating that EA’s appeal was argued and submitted to the Ninth Circuit in February of 2011,
but a decision has yet to come down).
240
Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 760 (D.N.J. 2011).
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Id. at 763.
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See supra Part V.A (stating that the virtual players had identical jersey numbers, home states,
physical attributes, and positions, and that users could download player names and upload them into the
game).
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Hart, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 763.
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Id. at 768.
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purposes.
The court began its First Amendment analysis by confirming that the
NCAA Football video game was entitled to the same protections afforded
to other expressive works.246 The next threshold question was whether
NCAA Football constituted commercial speech under the Third Circuit’s
three-factor test from Facenda.247 The court concluded that, unlike the
Madden NFL ‘06 infomercial at issue in Facenda, Hart alleged that the
expressive content of the game itself violated his right of publicity.248
The court then acknowledged that the Third Circuit had not adopted a
particular test for balancing the right of publicity and First Amendment,
but decided to analyze the case under the transformative use test.249 Judge
Wolfson engaged in a lengthy discussion of the history and criticisms of
copyright fair use from which the transformative use test derives.250
The court credited California state court decisions with developing the
transformative use doctrine in right of publicity cases.251 Thus, Comedy III
informed the analysis of competing publicity and free speech interests.252
However, unlike Keller, the court compared Hart’s case to two particularly
instructive decisions: Kirby and No Doubt.253 In contrast to the
transformative Ulala in Kirby, the avatars in No Doubt were unalterable
replicas of the band members.254 Moreover, unlike the immutable band
members in No Doubt, a user may alter Hart’s image in NCAA Football in

245

Id.
Id. at 771; see also Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011) (“Like the
protected books, plays and movies that preceded them, video games communicate ideas—and even
social messages—through many familiar literary devices . . . and through features distinctive to the
medium . . . [t]hat suffices to confer First Amendment protection.”).
247
Hart, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 770 (citing Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1017–18
(3d Cir. 2008)).
248
Id.
249
Id. at 776–77. The court also considered applying the “Rogers test,” an analysis devised by the
Second Circuit in a trademark law case; however, Judge Wolfson clearly preferred the transformative
use test as a “more refined” approach that “better balances the competing interests of the right of
publicity and the First Amendment.” Id. at 776, 787–88. Furthermore, he questioned “the wisdom of
applying a trade-mark-based test to right of publicity claims without accounting for” the different
concerns of the regimes. Id. at 791. Despite the issues with the Rogers test, the court felt no need to
adopt either since EA’s First Amendment defense prevailed under both tests. Id. at 777.
250
Judge Pierre N. Leval coined “transformative use” in 1990, arguing “the fair use doctrine is
best effectuated if individuals are permitted to appropriate another’s expression as ‘raw material’ that
the individual then ‘transform[s] in the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and
understandings.’” Id. at 778 (quoting Pierre N. Leval, Commentary, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990)). Just four years following the publishing of Judge Leval’s article,
the Supreme Court adopted the test in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. Id.
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many ways by editing his “personal characteristics,”
“accessories,”
“physical abilities,” “attributes and certain biographical details.”256
Despite the ability to alter his likeness, this case provided a “closer call
than that in Kirby and No Doubt” since placing Hart into an NCAA
Football game—the setting where the public recognizes him—”strongly
suggests that the goal of the game is to capitalize upon the fame of those
players.”257 In rejecting this argument, the court used language from the
Supreme Court to recognize that “features distinctive to [video games]”
include the player’s interaction with the virtual world by which it conveys
ideas and social messages.258 Thus, the court held that under the
transformative use test, EA was entitled to assert the First Amendment
defense to Hart’s appropriation claim.259
Before moving on, Judge Wolfson addressed the California court’s
conflicting decision. First, Keller’s substantive analysis declined to
address the ability to alter the players’ image, which the New Jersey court
found “significant because it suggests that the goal of the game is not for
the user to ‘be’ the player.”260 Moreover, this ability to alter “is itself a
noteworthy, expressive attribute of the game.”261 Second, the court
disagreed with Keller’s approach of focusing solely on the challenged
image, rather than the work as a whole.262
Contrary to Keller’s reasoning, I read Kirby as looking at the
video game in that case, as a whole. By focusing on the
setting in which the Ulala character appeared, Kirby
considered the entire game. Similarly, the Winter court
considered that the purported images of the Winter brother
musicians were “cartoon characters—half-human and halfworm—in a larger story, which itself is quite expressive.”
While the Winter court did focus most of its attention on the
fanciful worm-like characters, it also considered the larger
story of which the characters were a part.263
Judge Wolfson’s principal disagreement with Keller is the scope of the
255
Id. at 785. NCAA Football permits the user to alter the virtual player’s “height, weight,
hairstyle, face shape, body size, muscle size, and complexion.” Id. For example, a user may choose
from eight different hairstyle options including variations on a fade, close crop, afro, and balding. Id.
256
Id. at 783. The court noted that C.B.C.’s holding that the use of player names, statistics, and
biographical data is entitled to First Amendment protection as information within the public domain
also applies to the public facts connected with Hart’s image. Id. at 785 n.28.
257
Id. at 783.
258
Id. at 785 (quoting Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011)).
259
Id. at 787.
260
Id.
261
Id.
262
Id.
263
Id. (citations omitted).
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transformative use test: whether it considers only the transformation of the
celebrity depiction, or the transformative nature of the depiction in light of
its interaction with the overall work. This Note proposes a fair use
standard that addresses this issue and improves upon the failures of
established approaches.
VI. MONDAY MORNING QUARTERBACKING: A NEW FAIR USE STANDARD
The relationship between the right of publicity and copyright connotes
that the fair use defense can provide a strong model to incorporate First
Amendment limitations in right of publicity actions. Fair use is a judicially
constructed “rule of reason” establishing a privilege to use copyrighted
material in a reasonable manner without the owner’s consent.264 One
commentator has stated that:
The fair use doctrine thus recognizes that the development of
the arts and sciences may best be achieved by allowing for
the free dissemination of certain information affecting areas
of universal concern, such as history and biography. By
providing a limited privilege . . . fair use . . . preserve[s] a
marketplace of ideas.265
With Section 107 of the Copyright Act providing a model, a fair use
defense can be fashioned for application in right of publicity cases.
However, prior to modifying the factors, we must consider the differences
between the two intellectual property regimes to avoid a wholesale
importation of fair use that erroneously accommodates inapposite
copyright policies.
A. Comparing Copyright and the Right of Publicity
In 1976 Congress enacted the Copyright Act,266 granting exclusive
rights to original works of authorship.267 While copyright grants an
exclusive right in creative works, the right of publicity grants an exclusive
right over one’s personae.268 These monopolies run counter to the goals of
the First Amendment by chilling free expression; therefore, the need for
mechanisms to balance these private and public rights is necessary for both
regimes. This mechanism is and should be fair use, which “serves as an
264
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accommodation of competing [exclusive rights] and [F]irst [A]mendment
interests so as to preserve a marketplace of ideas.”269
The Supreme Court recognized that a state’s interest in protecting a
right of publicity “is closely analogous to the goals of . . . copyright
law.”270 Both copyright and the right of publicity “provide incentive[s] for
creative endeavor” that benefit the public at large.271 Copyright seeks the
advancement of the public welfare through the encouragement of
individual effort for monetary gain.272 This copyright policy corresponds
with the state’s interest in providing incentives to create valuable personas
and, consequently, encouraging the development of those skills or
achievements that foster public recognition. Similarly, these doctrines
function to ensure that the individual will be able “to reap the reward of his
endeavors.”273 The celebrity benefits from establishing commercially
valuable identities while the public benefits from the products of their
enterprise.274 These regimes are so alike that public policy requires
preemption of certain publicity rights when free enterprise and free
expression in non-copyrightable material trump those state interests.275
However, important differences require altering the fair use defense to
bolster right of publicity policies. At the most rudimentary level, the right
of publicity concerns a person, usually a celebrity, while copyright protects
works fixed in a tangible medium of expression. The right of publicity
protects ideas (e.g., a voice); conversely, the Supreme Court considered the
idea/expression dichotomy an implicit balancing mechanism for copyright
to accommodate the First Amendment.276 Likewise, some question
whether the First Amendment should tolerate state interests that undermine
free expression; copyright is deserving of such a balance since the
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Founders grounded it within the Constitution.
Certain policies differ as well. At least one court has advanced the
view that a violation of the right of publicity strikes at one’s personhood
more than an infringement of a copyrighted work.278 The fair use
doctrine—and copyright in general—does not look to prevent consumer
deception by ensuring that consumers receive accurate information about
sponsorship and endorsement.279 Furthermore, legal scholar Roberta
Rosenthal Kwall has argued that unjust enrichment is a principal rationale
for the right of publicity, while the same interest in copyright has waned in
recent years.280
B. Altering the Factors
With these key differences in mind, we must adjust the original section
107 factors to promote the policies of the right of publicity. The proposed
factors for publicity rights include:
1. the nature of the speech, including the extent to
which the use is transformative;
2. the nature of the asserted publicity right;
3. the scope of the misappropriation in relation to the
purpose of the use;
4. the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the publicity right.281
1. The Nature of the Speech
This factor will not require an analysis of whether the use is
commercial in nature, since a prima facie case requires proof of
commerciality. Initially, a court should consider whether the use falls
within a preferred category of expression or within the sphere of
commercial speech. The categories enumerated in § 107 have direct
application to the right of publicity, including “criticism, comment, news
277
See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 177, at 913 (questioning whether the First Amendment can
endure states barring citizens from being able to express themselves in particular fashions).
278
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(D.N.J. 2011) (“I question the wisdom of applying a trademark-based test to right of publicity claims
without accounting for [the] difference[s].”).
280
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340, 352–56 (1991) (discrediting the “sweat of the brow” theory of copyright protection that underlies
the unjust enrichment justification).
281
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reporting, teaching . . . scholarship, [and] research.”
Additionally, the
California Supreme Court has recognized that the right of publicity does
not provide a shield from creativity in the form of “caricature, parody283
and satire.”284 In contrast, the commercial speech doctrine prescribes that
wholly commercial uses should receive diminished protection.285
Moreover, this factor would provide no protection to falsified celebrity
endorsement in accord with the First Amendment.286
For example, if someone wrote an unauthorized biography of Derek
Jeter, would this be a violation of the shortstop’s right of publicity?
Assuming that all the facts within the biography are true,287 or at least
mostly true,288 the right of publicity would yield to “the free dissemination
of thoughts, ideas, newsworthy events, and matters of public interest.”289
In this scenario, the unauthorized biography falls within the “newsworthy”
category of protected activity, and would usually result in a finding of fair
use. By incorporating First Amendment principles directly into the first
factor, this fair use standard protects preferred speech categories while
providing diminished protection for commercial speech. These categories,
though not dispositive, will instruct the fair use ruling absent strong
countervailing policies present in the other factors.
However, unsurprisingly, most cases do not fall within these preferred
or non-preferred categories. In between fall those misappropriations that
challenge the court to sift through both expressive and commercial
elements. Here, courts will apply the transformative use test derived from
Comedy III.290 However, the test will be different in one respect; no longer
will transformation be a question of sufficiency, but rather of degree.
Since transformative use will no longer be dispositive, it provides an
opportunity to place this inquiry on a sliding scale. The new test will ask
the degree to which the “celebrity likeness is one of the ‘raw materials’
from which an original work is synthesized, or . . . the very sum and
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substance of the work in question.”
Though a subtle change, placing transformation on a spectrum makes a
rigid standard much more flexible. Comedy III and Winter still bookend
the spectrum from a purely commercial, non-transformative use to a
substantial transformation.292 ETW provides the middling example and
shows the benefits of this flexible factor. The literal depiction of Tiger
Woods denotes little to no transformation within the lithograph; however,
the panorama of golf legends adds a slight transformation in the form of an
objectively discernible message.293 In such a scenario, neither party should
benefit from this factor; therefore, the court must consider the other factors
to make a ruling.
The new construction of this factor incorporates the predominant use
test and the Restatement approach, but capitalizes on their flaws by
creating a sliding scale that removes the sufficiency determination.
Furthermore, it refines the transformative use inquiry to allow for judicial
discretion and consideration of other factors.
2. The Nature of the Publicity Right
This factor acts as a limiting principle on those instances of fame that
do not comport with the twin policies of unjust enrichment and incentive
creation. In other words, when the celebrity’s “persona is entirely of his
own creation, his publicity rights deserve more protection.”294 Admittedly,
this factor has little to do with its copyright counterpart, which considers
distinctions like fiction v. non-fiction295 and published v. unpublished296
works.
Instead, it incorporates both right of publicity and First
Amendment policies by limiting the scope of a celebrity’s right in favor of
the public domain that is responsible for his or her fame.
In fashioning his own fair use standard, Randall Coyne developed a
similar explanation for this factor. He proposed, “to the extent that
plaintiff’s acquisition of fame is unrelated to his creative or intellectual
efforts, his assertion of publicity rights is undermined.”297 This provides a
cogent response to Madow’s qualms with the incentive creation and unjust
enrichment justifications. First, affording more protection to those
celebrities who create their own valuable personas through their own labor
incentivizes such behavior.298 Second, it is unjust for a celebrity to obtain
291
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an exclusive monopoly over a right that the public is largely responsible
for creating.299 This factor will allow the public to enjoy the benefits of
creating a valuable persona by enlarging the public domain and First
Amendment protections.
The question is how do we differentiate between these two publicity
rights? How do we classify those personas created by both the celebrity’s
labor and the public at large? The first classification, active publicity, will
comprise the personas of celebrities who have expended “time, effort,
skills, and . . . money”300 to acquire such fame. In contrast, passive
publicity encompasses those commercial identities created solely by the
public and media. For example, those who attain notoriety “through sheer
luck . . . public scandal, or . . . grossly immoral conduct”301 should not
receive the same publicity rights that athletes and entertainers enjoy. A
combination of both creates—as Justice Antonin Scalia would say—a
tertium quid,302 which, for purposes of this factor, will have the effect of
passive publicity in favor of a larger public domain.303
In hindsight, this factor should have played a defining role in an
important Ninth Circuit case. In Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, celebrity Paris
Hilton sued Hallmark Cards for selling a birthday card reading “Paris’s
First Day as a Waitress.”304 Inside the card was Paris’s face superimposed
on a cartoon waitress body saying her catch phrase “That’s hot.”305 The
Ninth Circuit held that Hallmark’s “transformative” defense was
insufficient to grant the Anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss because the card
depicted Paris in her natural setting as “born to privilege, working as a
waitress.”306
In such a close case, looking at the nature of the publicity right may
have provided a more fitting decision. At the outset, the court described
Paris as a “controversial celebrity known for her lifestyle as a flamboyant
heiress [or in other words] ‘famous for being famous.’”307 The court even
acknowledged that Hallmark attempted to parody Paris’s reality television
299
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show “The Simple Life,” where in one episode she worked as a waitress at
a fast food restaurant.308 Paris Hilton fits comfortably within the definition
of passive publicity; her fame is a product of a complex social process
involving both the public and the media molding and constructing her
image. According to the Ninth Circuit, while Paris exploits this fame
through reality television shows, a self-titled pop album, and various
commercial products, the public domain—which is responsible for her
success—must yield to her publicity right. Although a birthday card may
qualify as commercial speech, the apparent parody and ample expression
combined with a passive publicity classification should have resulted in a
dismissal of the case.
3. The Extent of the Misappropriation
This factor has obvious application within the right of publicity
context. Simply put, the court evaluates the extent of the misappropriation.
In reference to the transformative test, the Supreme Court of California
stated, “[t]he inquiry is in a sense more quantitative than qualitative, asking
whether the literal and imitative or the creative elements predominate in
the work.”309
This statement is significant for two reasons. First, unlike copyright,
the application of this factor to the right of publicity will stress quantity
rather than the quality of the expression. Second, and more importantly,
the use of the word “work,” as opposed to identity or persona, suggests that
the inquiry should consider the entire work as a whole. Later, the court
reiterated this point by asking whether the “product containing [the]
celebrity’s likeness is so transformed that it has become primarily the
defendant’s own expression rather than the celebrity’s likeness.”310
The California Supreme Court reiterated this rule in Winter, stating
that the comic book characters were “in a larger story, which is itself quite
expressive.”311 In Kirby, the court did not consider the depiction of the
celebrity in isolation. Rather, it found that Ulala was a “‘fanciful, creative
character’ who exist[ed] in the context of a unique and expressive video
game.”312 In ETW, the Sixth Circuit considered the literal depiction of
Tiger Woods within the context of the entire painting, including the
background of golf legends, which formed the transformative message.313
Thus, the inquiry goes beyond merely looking at the depiction of the
308
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celebrity.
The underlying medium containing the celebrity depiction will dictate
the extent of the misappropriation. For example, in Comedy III, the
lithograph comprised a literal depiction of the Three Stooges; therefore, the
court need not consider anything beyond the portrayal of the performers.314
On the other hand, in ETW, the court had to consider Tiger Woods’s
depiction and its interaction with the golf legends in the background.315
The Supreme Court agreed with this conception of misappropriation
stating that “[v]ideo games . . . [l]ike the protected books, plays, and
movies . . . communicate ideas . . . through familiar literary devices and
through features distinctive to the medium.”316 Thus, the First Amendment
protects not only the transformation of the celebrity depiction, but also the
transformative nature of the depiction’s interaction with its underlying
medium.
Kirby and No Doubt determined the appropriation in this manner as
well. In Kirby, the California court considered not only the depiction of
Kirby as “Ulala,” but also the twenty-fifth century space age setting in
which the character existed.317 The court took a holistic approach in
evaluating the character’s manifestation within a transformative setting that
gave rise to sufficient expression to afford First Amendment protection.
Conversely, the depiction of the rock band No Doubt within Band Hero
was not sufficiently transformative.318 However, it is important to note that
the court considered whether the band’s image was “immutable” and that
the avatars could not be altered.319 While the court failed to consider the
setting in which these avatars interacted and placed undue emphasis on the
celebrity depiction, it did consider a feature—user alteration—distinctive
to video games in general. Kirby and No Doubt set the stage for Keller and
Hart, which is why this factor will play an important role in remedying the
contradictory opinions.
4. The Effect of the Use on the Potential Market
This factor is nearly identical to its copyright counterpart, asking
whether the misappropriation affects the celebrity’s use on the present or
potential licensing market. The Supreme Court, in reference to copyright,
described this factor by stating that “a use that has no demonstrable effect
upon the potential market for, or the value of, the copyrighted work need
not be prohibited in order to protect the author’s incentive to create.”320
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This reference to incentive creation and the effect upon the potential
market has direct application to the right of publicity.
The Restatement defines the contours of this factor.321 Courts should
analyze the market effect “in light of the informational or creative content
of the defendant’s use.”322 In the case of an imitation, the public interest in
fostering competition and creating an expansive public domain will often
outweigh the adverse effects on the celebrity’s market.323 However, literal
reproductions create a greater likelihood of harm to an individual’s right of
publicity.
The scope of commercial injury is vast. At the most basic level, the
right of publicity protects against the unauthorized exploitation of the
goodwill and reputation linked to one’s name or likeness to his or her
commercial detriment.324 The protection extends to appropriations of a
work product linked with the plaintiff’s identity. An example of this
would be Zacchini’s “human cannonball” performance. The commercial
harm would not only include the loss of a licensing opportunity, but also
the amount the infringer benefitted from using the name or likeness. For
example, Zacchini should have recovered for the lost profits in his “human
cannonball” performance and lost licensing opportunities to the video of
his performance. However, he should also recover the value that he
brought to the news broadcast, or the value of the number of viewers that
he attracted to the Scripps-Howard broadcast as opposed to its regular
viewing audience.
Finally, the right of publicity even protects against the dilution of the
commercial value of one’s identity through excessive or harmful uses.325
Zacchini’s “entire act” standard fits nicely within this factor protecting
against severe infringements that affect a person’s ability to earn a
livelihood. The broadcasting of his entire “human cannonball” act
“pose[d] a substantial threat to the economic value of that performance.”326
The Sixth Circuit applied the Restatement’s conception of this factor as
well. In ETW, the court reasoned that “[Tiger] Woods . . . engages in an
activity, professional golf, that in itself generates a significant amount of
income which is unrelated to his right of publicity. [Absent this right], he
would still be able to reap substantial financial rewards from authorized
appearances and endorsements.”327 The court held that the use of Woods’s
likeness in the prints did not reduce the commercial value of his
321
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likeness.

C. Application to Hart and Keller
This new fair use test provides the mechanism for reconciling the
conflicting decisions of Keller and Hart. Regarding the first factor, it is
evident that the quarterbacks’ likenesses do not fall within the preferred or
commercial speech categories. Therefore, we must consider the degree of
transformation in light of the “features distinctive to the medium.”329 This
will include the ability to alter characteristics, play in different modes
including the “Road to Glory,” and the interaction of the player with the
virtual stadium and fans. As Judge Wolfson contended, “it is logically
inconsistent to consider the setting in which the character sits, which Keller
does in its analysis, yet ignore the remainder of the game.”330 Despite
being near literal depictions of the quarterbacks, NCAA Football’s total
transformation within the distinctive features of a video game weighs this
factor slightly in favor of Electronic Arts.
Most collegiate athletes fall within the active publicity classification.
Through their hard work and effort, these athletes attain a degree of fame,
albeit some more than others, to exploit during their collegiate careers.
Athletes will usually benefit from this factor because of how easily their
publicity rights comport with the Lockean labor justification.
The third factor presents a great amount of overlap with the first. We
cannot simply consider the depiction of Keller and Hart, but rather we
must evaluate the extent of the appropriation with respect to the entire
work. The scope of the inquiry is precisely what caused the contradictory
decisions. The Northern District of California merely considered the
depiction of Keller, while the District of New Jersey looked at the
depiction of Hart within NCAA Football as a whole. The Hart decision
was correct in ruling that the misappropriation was negligible in light of
the “creative elements [that] predominate in the work.”331
Finally, the fourth factor will weigh against a finding of infringement.
Disregarding whether the former student-athletes or the NCAA own the
right to license their likenesses,332 the imitation of Keller and Hart in
NCAA Football has little to no demonstrable effect on the potential
licensing market. Unlike Zacchini, the student-athletes are not in danger of
losing their ability to earn a livelihood. Therefore, the interests of the
public domain trump their publicity rights.
328
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This new fair use test clearly delineates the necessary considerations to
incorporate the First Amendment into the right of publicity. After applying
this test to Keller and Hart, it is clear where the California court went
wrong, and that Judge Wolfson was correct in ruling in favor of Electronic
Arts.
There are three primary benefits in adopting this Note’s proposed fair
use standard. First, and most obvious, is the creation of uniformity among
the lower courts. As previously discussed, no test has garnered as much
widespread recognition as the foremost test to balance the right of publicity
and the First Amendment. Implementing this Note’s proposed fair use
standard could provide outcomes that are more predictable and prevent
forum shopping.
Second, the proposed fair use standard attempts to remedy the flaws of
the established balancing tests. For example, the first factor changes the
transformative inquiry from a black and white, yes or no inquiry into one
with much more flexibility. The traditional transformative use test
required a dispositive decision that caused inconsistencies like the Keller
and Hart opinions.
Third, and most importantly, this standard will combat the gradual
expansion of the right of publicity beyond that which Prosser or Nimmer
could imagine. Under the proposed fair use standard, the First Amendment
right of the video game publisher trumps the collegiate athletes’ right of
publicity. As the right of publicity grows to protect even the evocation of a
celebrity’s likeness,333 an expansive fair use standard is necessary to
maintain a rich public domain. As Judge Kozinski stated, “Overprotecting
intellectual property is as harmful as underprotecting it. . . . [and, in fact,]
stifles the very creative forces it’s supposed to nurture.”334
The remaining ambit of the right of publicity will protect against
unauthorized advertisements and endorsements.
In other words,
commercial speech will encompass most of the infringements of publicity
rights. Of course, this fair use standard still provides breathing room for
some infringements beyond commercial speech and some fair uses that
constitute commercial speech.
VII. CONCLUSION
Balancing the First Amendment against the right of publicity has
proved frustrating ever since Zacchini. This Note’s proposed test provides
the uniformity that scholars and courts have sought for over thirty-five
333
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years.
The conflicting Keller and Hart opinions represent the state of
the entire area of law—muddled in a variety of tests with no predictive
value. The lack of a clear standard is chilling the First Amendment
guarantee of free expression and deterring creative endeavors. This district
split—and potential circuit split—provides an opportunity for the Supreme
Court, or Congress, to clarify this chaotic area of law with a fair use
standard that specially pertains to the right of publicity.
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